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Abstract 
With the social demand for childcare service diversifying and local governments 
becoming increasingly cash-strapped, the proportion of public nursery schools in the 
childcare sector has been shrinking in recent years. The funding reforms of 2004, 
which abolished the national subsidy to public nursery schools, are seen as one of the 
triggers of this phenomenon. Using a panel dataset of 983 municipalities across the 
nation, this paper investigates the impact of the reforms on the operating costs of 
public nursery schools. We found that different municipalities responded differently to 
the reforms. In areas with relatively large populations, fiscally stronger municipalities 
were likely to spend less on public nursery schools in the wake of the reforms, while 
municipalities in smaller cities spent more. Besides, municipalities that were not 
compensated for the loss of the national subsidy reduced expenditures in large cities. In 
small cities, on the other hand, such municipalities actually increased expenditures.  
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1. Introduction 
Preschool education and childcare services in Japan mainly involve kindergartens 
(youchien) and nursery schools (hoikusyo). Unlike kindergartens that provide school 
education (gakko kyoiku) to children aged 3 to 5, nursery schools offer care (hoiku) to 
infants and young children up to the age of 5 who lack childcare at home. In this sense, 
childcare in nursery schools is distinct from the school education system in Japan.
１
 
Following an increase in the number of nuclear family households and a rise in the 
employment rate of women, the demand for childcare service, hoiku, is growing and 
becoming more complex. In Japan, childcare is provided mainly by nursery schools, 
both public and private. In recent years, however, private nursery schools, which offer 
more flexibility, tight local government finances, and the high cost structure of public 
nursery schools
２
 have led to a shrinking share of public nursery schools (Fig 1).  
Public nursery schools in Japan are operated by the municipalities. Until the fiscal 
year 2003, 50% of their operating costs were subsidized by the national government as 
a specific purpose grant. On April 1, 2004, however, this subsidy was abolished and 
municipalities were required to finance all costs from their general revenues. The main 
purpose of this reform was to allow municipalities to become more autonomous so that 
they could improve their administrative efficiency and become more responsive to the 
increasingly sophisticated demand for childcare. Although loss of the subsidy was to 
be compensated with an increase in general revenues allocated through the system of 
Local Allocation Tax (LAT), the cost of running public nursery schools became more 
dependent on each municipality’s fiscal situation. It is believed that this change in the 
funding structure accelerated the spending cuts on and the privatization of public 
nursery schools. For example, a survey by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare 
found that nearly 40% of municipalities across the nation reduced their operational 
budgets for public nursery schools in the 2004 budget (Takagi, 2005). According to the 
                                                   
１
 In recent years, kindergartens have been increasingly merged with nursery schools.  
２
 Hayashi (1996) examined cost differences between public and private nursery schools in 31 
municipalities in Osaka prefecture. Owing to data availability constraints, he used the total cost of child 
welfare services as a proxy for the cost of nursery schools. He reported that a one percent increase in the 
share of public nurseries’ total capacity induces an increase in the cost of child welfare services per child 
of 7,868 Japanese yen. This is attributed to the additional allocation of staff in public nursery schools 
and their higher cost because nursery staff tends to be older.     
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results of the survey
３
 conducted by the Japan Childcare Association (JCA), 
municipalities spent on average 2.4% less per enrolled child in a public nursery school 
in 2007 compared with 2003. In cities with populations of more than 300,000, the 
reduction was as high as 5% on average.  
Many previous studies have attempted to evaluate the effects of such policy 
changes empirically. Ahlin and Mörk (2008) looked at whether the policies of 
educational decentralization in Sweden caused any structural changes to local school 
expenditures by simply applying interaction terms of localities’ fiscal characteristics 
such as tax base and total intergovernmental grants and year dummies that took the 
value 1 after the reform. Applying the same estimation method, Kobayashi and 
Hayashi (2011) examined how changes in funding affected municipal expenditures on 
Japan’s School Expense Assistance (SEA) program. Using panel data for 2004 and 
2007 to examine the reforms of 2005, they showed that municipalities’ financial 
strength affected SEA benefits per recipient more after the reforms. With recent 
developments of quasi-experimental methods, such as the difference-in-differences 
(DID) approach, a number of studies have studied the effects of administrative or fiscal 
reforms in various policy fields. In the field of education, for example, Wang et al. 
(2011) investigated how provincial-level reforms affected local education expenditures 
in China. They concluded that counties that were subject to reforms tended to spend 
less on public education than other counties. In the field of childcare services, Mörk et 
al. (2013) identified the causal effect of childcare costs on fertility rate, in the context 
of exogenous variation in household user charges caused by Swedish childcare reforms. 
In Japan, Ohtake and Sano (2009) and Hayashi and Kobayashi (2010) investigated the 
effects of money transfers from government disbursement to LAT on compulsory 
educational expenditures and on SEA benefits, respectively.  
Although the negative impact of the reforms on public nursery schools seems 
obvious, we have not found any empirical investigation so far. Did the reforms actually 
trigger municipalities’ lower spending on public nursery schools? If this were true, 
which were the municipalities that were worst hit? This study investigates empirically 
                                                   
３
 The survey, conducted on April 1, 2007, targeted 807 municipalities across the country. The collection 
ratio was 73.5%. (http://www.nippo.or.jp/news/pdfs/outline.pdf) 
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the impact of the change in funding scheme on the operational costs of public nursery 
schools. More specifically, we investigate the impact of the change in fiscal strength on 
the operational costs of public nursery schools before and after the reform. Second, we 
examine the impact of the reform by focusing on the revenue compensation through 
LAT being applied only to specific municipalities. We found that municipalities 
responded differently to the reform according to the size of the cities in which they 
operated. In areas with relatively large populations, fiscally stronger municipalities 
were likely to spend less on public nursery schools in the wake of reforms, while 
spending more in smaller cities. Besides, municipalities that were not compensated for 
the loss of national subsidy reduced their expenditures in large cities. But in small 
cities, such municipalities actually increased expenditures. After controlling for other 
factors, we did not find any significant impact of the reform on municipalities’ 
expenditures on public nursery schools in towns and villages.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the funding system for 
public nursery schools in Japan, before giving an overview of the 2004 reforms and 
their impact on the public nursery school sector. Section 3 details the study’s empirical 
strategy and the data. Section 4 presents the results of our estimation, and Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
Fig 1: Ownership pattern of nursery schools and their enrolment 
 
Source: author (refer to the Survey of Social Welfare Institutions) 
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2. Institutional background 
2.1 The funding system for public nursery schools  
The Child Welfare Act in 1947 mandates that municipalities (cities, towns, and 
villages) are responsible for taking care of children who lack sufficient care in either 
public or private nursery schools. The operating costs of public nursery schools 
comprise mainly personnel, service, and administrative expenses, which are funded by 
both the government and a household user charge. The total operational cost is 
estimated based on the unit price (monthly operational cost per enrolled child), which 
is legally defined by the national government. This depends on the age of the child (0–
1, 2–3, and 4–5), the capacity of the nursery school, and the size of the municipality it 
is located in. The national government also sets the user charge based on the child’s 
age, the number of enrolments, and household income. However, each municipality 
can decide upon the actual user fee charged.  
Fig 2 shows the funding system for public nursery schools. Until 2003, 50% of 
the estimated total operating costs, after deducting the user charge, were taken care of 
by the national government. The other half was funded by the prefecture (the local 
government unit above the municipality) and by the municipality. Although the unit 
price is supposedly set at a level that ensures universal and quality childcare across the 
country, the amount is seen as too low to fulfill the actual local demand for childcare. 
As a result, there is a significant gap between the legally determined operating cost and 
the actual cost. Kimura and Sugiyama (2009) pointed out the following specific 
problems with the current national standard: the estimated minimum requirement of 
nursery schools is too low; the estimated expense on nursery staff is much lower than 
what is actually required; and, considering the growing demand for childcare services, 
an opening time of eight hours per day is too short. Moreover, in most cases, 
municipalities disregard the set user charge and determine their own charge for 
households in order to reduce the burden on households. All these factors resulted in 
municipalities having to spend more on public nursery schools to ensure quality 
childcare by hiring better-paid staff or offering special care. This puts pressure on local 
governments operating under tight budgets. 
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Fig 2: The funding system for public nursery schools 
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2.1 The 2004 reform 
Until March 2004, 50% of the public expense was subsidized by the national 
government as a specific purpose grant. On April 1, 2004, however, this national 
government subsidy system was abolished in the wake of decentralization; 
approximately 166 billion yen were moved from national to local tax revenues. At the 
same time, prefectural disbursements were also abolished. As a result, municipalities 
had to take responsibility for financing public nursery schools from their own budgets. 
The burden on municipalities reached 332 billion yen in the fiscal year 2004 (Osawa, 
2004; p.106). Fig 3 shows the trend in accumulated total operating costs for public 
nursery schools by revenue source. It is clear that since the 2004 reforms, the share of 
national and prefectural disbursement decreased, while the share of general revenues 
5 
 
increased significantly. Although the increase in general revenue was more significant 
than the decrease in specific grant in the immediate aftermath of reforms, the 
proportion soon began to decline steadily. Yamamoto (2011), who analyzed the 
financial situation of public nursery schools in Fujinomiya city in Shizuoka prefecture, 
reported that cuts of personnel expense accounted for a large share of decrease in 
general revenues after the reforms. 
 
Fig 3: Trend in revenue sources of public nursery schools 
  
Source: Author (refer to the Survey of Local Finance Situation) 
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LAT recipients, the total revenue from the national government could be regarded as 
the same both before and after the reforms. However, for non-LAT recipients, the 
reforms simply meant lower revenues.  
Of course, there was no guarantee that LAT recipients would not reduce operating 
costs since LAT is an unconditional revenue source. As mentioned in the Introduction, 
Takagi (2005) and the JCA (2007) reported that many municipalities cut their operating 
budgets for public nursery schools significantly after the reforms. Moreover, the 
nationwide survey conducted by the JCA in 2005 also reported different reactions in 
regions with municipalities of different sizes. Based on a grouping of six regions 
according to their population size,
４
 the JCA reported that cost cutting was more 
significant in areas with relatively larger populations than in other areas with smaller 
populations. Specifically, in those cities with the largest populations, the percentage of 
public nursery schools which reported the cost cut of childcare services after the 
reform was the highest, reaching 47.6%, with 31.6% being the average; in places with 
the smallest populations, such as towns and villages, up to 51.7% (48.3% on average) 
of public nursery schools said their budgets remained almost the same. Underpinning 
these different reactions is the position that public nursery schools hold in different 
areas. In urban areas, where the employment rate of women is high, demand for 
childcare is likely to be greater and more complex than in rural areas. In response to 
this demand, not only public but also the growth of private nursery schools has been 
significant. In rural areas, on the other hand, public nursery schools continue to 
dominate. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that depending on the size of cities, local 
governments would respond differently to the reforms. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
４
 The JCA (2005) investigated changes in the local financial situations of public nursery schools after 
the reform. A questionnaire was submitted to 689 nursery schools, of which 291 were public schools and 
398 were private. The regions were divided into the following groups: special wards and designated 
cities; prefectural capital cities; core cities with populations of more than 150,000; small cities with 
populations of more than 50,000 and less than 150,000; small cities with populations of less than 
50,000; and towns and villages. 
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3. Test strategy and data 
3.1 Empirical strategy 
  We use the panel dataset of a Japanese municipality to analyze the effects of the 
2004 reforms on municipalities’ expenditures on public nursery schools. Our main 
purpose is to examine if there was any change in the impact of fiscal strength on public 
nursery school expenditures before and after the reforms and to estimate the average 
treatment effect of the reform. Since the census survey we used is conducted every five 
years, we can only use a five-year interval dataset. Besides, the number of enrolled 
children after 2005 is not available from our data source.
５
 Hence, we use municipality 
panel data with a five-year interval from the years 2000 and 2005. In addition, we 
eliminate consolidated municipalities from our observations. Our final dataset is 
unbalanced panel data from 1,906 observations covering 983 municipalities in the 
years 2000 and 2005. To answer the first question, we will estimate the following 
empirical model based on the specification approach used by Ahlin and Mörk (2008) 
and Kobayashi and Hayashi (2011). 
 
                  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + (𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐷2005)𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛄𝐗𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 denotes operating costs for public nursery schools per enrolled child in 
municipality i in year t. 𝐗 is the vector of independent variables that can influence 
cost. 𝑣𝑖, 𝑣𝑡, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are unobserved municipality-specific fixed effect, year effect, and 
an idiosyncratic error term (𝑖𝑖𝑑~𝑁(0,1)), respectively.  
Since we want to focus on the change in the burden on municipalities, we deduct 
the amount of user charges from total operating costs. 𝐷2005 is the dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 in 2005. 𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 is the variable that indicates fiscal strength; 
we use a fiscal capacity indicator (FCI) of municipality i. FCI is a simple three-year 
average of the numbers derived by dividing BFR by BFN, which is used to calculate 
ordinary LATs. In general, a higher FCI means stronger fiscal capacity. We focus on 
the estimated parameter of the interaction term 𝛽2 that captures the change in the 
                                                   
５
 The data source is the Public Facilities Survey (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
[MIC]). For more details, refer to the description of data under Section 3.2.  
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effect of fiscal strength on childcare costs. In model (1), we assume we can capture the 
effects of the reform by employing a year dummy variable that takes the value 1 in 
2005. However, this method may fail to identify any possible macroeconomic 
fluctuations during the period of analysis and the influence of funding reforms. To 
overcome this problem and extract more accurately the effects of the reforms, we can 
utilize the empirical strategy suggested by Ohtake and Sano (2009) and Hayashi and 
Kobayshi (2010).   
Compensation for the fiscal loss through LAT can only be enjoyed by LAT 
recipients that are “weak” enough to manage their finances based on their own local 
tax revenues. Therefore, as Hayashi and Kobayashi (2010) pointed out, for non-LAT 
recipients, this reform implies a rise in the real price of childcare service. Thus, as long 
as LAT compensates exactly the same amount as the loss caused by abolishing the 
national grant, only non-LAT municipalities feel the impact of a decrease in revenue. 
Therefore, by regarding non-LAT municipalities as a treatment group and LAT 
municipalities as a control group, we can apply a DID approach to clarify the average 
treatment effect of the reform. We can interpret this effect as the income effect of LAT 
compensation on public nursery school expenditures. Let subscripts 𝑎 and 𝑏 denote 
“after” and “before” reforms; the change in operating costs in the treated group (i.e., 
non-LAT municipalities) is measured by 𝐸𝑖(𝑦1𝑎 − 𝑦1𝑏|𝑑 = 1)  and that for the 
untreated group (i.e., LAT municipalities) by 𝐸𝑖(𝑦1𝑎 − 𝑦1𝑏|𝑑 = 0), where 𝑑 takes the 
value 1 for the treatment group and 0 otherwise. Then, if the parallel trend and 
common trend assumptions are valid, DID is a measure  (𝑦1𝑎 − 𝑦1𝑏|𝑑 = 1) −
 𝐸𝑖(𝑦1𝑎 − 𝑦1𝑏|𝑑 = 0) of the treatment effect.
６
 
   In this case, by defining the following regression model and obtaining the DID 
estimator (𝛿), we estimate the average treatment effects of the reform.  
 
 ∆𝑦𝑖 = 𝑐 + 𝛿𝑁𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖 + ∑ 𝜃𝑘∆𝑋𝑘,𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖                    (2) 
 
where  𝑁𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖  indicates the dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the 
municipality is a non-LAT recipient and 0 otherwise, in 2005. This model is defined as 
                                                   
６
 For a more detailed discussion, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005, Chapter 25). 
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follows and is based on Hayashi and Kobayashi (2010). Let 𝑀𝑖𝑡  indicate the amount of 
general transfers, including LAT grants of the ith municipality in year t. A series of 
control variables (𝑋ℎ𝑖) is the same as the ones we consider in equation (1). Then, 
operating cost can be defined as the following linear response equation (3). Equation 
(2) is derived through the differentiation of equation (3). 
 
                               𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡 + 𝜆𝑀𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃ℎ𝑋ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡             (3) 
 
Taking the first difference of equation (3), we get equation (4) as given below: 
 
(𝑦𝑖,2005 − 𝑦𝑖,2000)
= (𝛼2005 − 𝛼2000) + 𝜆(𝑀𝑖,2005 − 𝑀𝑖,2000)
+ (∑ 𝜃ℎ𝑋ℎ,𝑖,2005 − ∑ 𝜃ℎ𝑋ℎ,𝑖,2000) + (𝜀𝑖,2005 − 𝜀𝑖,2000) 
 
                                          ∆𝑦𝑖 = 𝑐 + 𝜆∆𝑀𝑖 + ∑ 𝜃𝑘∆𝑋𝑘,𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖                    (4) 
 
Assuming we control for other factors in general revenues, ∆𝑀𝑖 will capture the net 
change in total expense for public nursery schools after the reforms. So long as LAT 
completely offsets the loss of national subsidy, ∆𝑀𝑖  will be equal to 0 for 
municipalities with 𝑁𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖 = 0 . Therefore, we can derive 𝜆∆𝑀𝑖 = 𝜆(𝑁𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖 =
1)∆𝑀𝑖 + 𝜆(𝑁𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖 = 0)∆𝑀𝑖 = 𝜆𝑁𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖∆𝑀𝑖 = 𝛿𝑁𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖 and get  𝛿 = 𝜆∆𝑀𝑖 . If we 
assume operating cost is a normal good, 𝛿 will be interpreted as the negative income 
effect since ∆𝑀𝑖 < 0 for municipalities with 𝑁𝐿𝐴𝐿𝑖 = 1. 
   Fig 4 represents reform of the funding system and the DID estimator (𝛿) is our 
estimate. The operating and other costs per enrolled child are represented on the 
horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. Assume that before the reforms, 
municipalities select the optimization point a given the budget constraint line AB. After 
reforms, the budget constraint line for non-LAT municipalities shifts from AB to AC; 
therefore, the optimization point moves to b. On the other hand, inasmuch as LAT 
perfectly offsets the national subsidy, LAT municipalities will optimize at point c with 
the new budget constraint line ED. The DID estimator (𝛿) in equation (2) will capture 
10 
 
the difference between the decrease in LAT municipalities (from a to c) and that in 
non-LAT municipalities (from a to b). 𝛿 will carry a negative sign if childcare service 
is a normal good (the figure on the left side).  
Fig 4: Impact of abolishing the national subsidy and compensation through LAT 
Fig 4-1: When public childcare service is a normal good 
 
Fig 4-2: When public childcare service is an inferior good 
 
 
Source: Author (refer to Ohtake and Sano (2009)) 
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3.1 Data description  
We define the dependent variable as the operating cost of public nursery schools per 
enrolled child in each municipality. The data is drawn from the Survey of Local 
Finance Situation (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications [MIC]). 
Information on the number of enrolled children and other details about nursery schools 
is obtained from the Public Facilities Survey (Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications [MIC]). As for the independent variables, we first consider controls 
that reflect socioeconomic factors, such as population (POP), the share of preschool 
population in total population (PRESCHOOL), and the share of taxpayers in total 
population (TAXPAYER). Preschool population refers to the populations of children 
under the age of 5. The share of taxpayers in total population is included as an 
indicator of wealth. PRESCHOOL is included to capture a municipality’s reaction to 
potential demand in the area. However, as Asada (2009) pointed out, this variable may 
be potentially endogenous as a result of “Tiebout sorting.” That is, households with 
children under the age of 5 could move to an area where local childcare service is more 
readily available. To avoid the possible bias of coefficients in the case of OLS 
estimation, we run panel IV estimation additionally using the ratio of preschool 
population five years ago and the employment rate of women five years ago as 
instrumental variables. These variables are independent of the current level of 
municipality expense on childcare. Based on the test result of endogeneity of 
PRESCHOOL, we will decide which model to use. As stated in Section 2.1., childcare 
costs largely depend on the age structure of enrolled children. However, owing to data 
availability issues, we do not have the actual number of enrolled children by age in 
each nursery school. Therefore, we approximate the age structure of actual enrolled 
children by the population’s age structure in each municipality, assuming 
municipalities offer childcare services to meet potential demand in the relevant area. 
That is, we consider the share of infants aged 0, of children aged 1 to 2, and of children 
aged 3 and above in the preschool population (R0, R1–2, and R3) to capture the effects 
of the different age compositions on childcare costs. These age segments meet the 
actual classification that the national government uses to calculate the unit price of 
childcare in public nursery schools. We treat the share of children aged 4 to 5 in the 
preschool population as a base group.  
12 
 
Next, we consider independent variables that relate to a nursery’s management. To 
obtain the annual average wage of workers, we divide regular personnel expenses by 
the total number of administrative and nursery staff after deducting temporary staff 
(WAGE).
７
 Higher wages would push up the operating costs. We also consider the 
ratio of temporary staff in total staff (TEMPORARY STAFF). The more temporary 
staff the municipality hires, the lower are its childcare costs. In addition, we take the 
effects of economies of scale into account. Hence, we include the holding capacity of 
public nursery schools (CAPSCHOOL). Lastly, we include the sufficiency rate of 
public nursery schools (SUFFICIENCY). This indicator is calculated by taking the 
ratio of total holding capacity of public nursery schools to the number of potential 
applicants in each municipality. The number of potential applicants is surveyed by each 
municipality’s ordinance and is obtained from the Public Facilities Survey. In urban 
cities, a long waiting list for nursery school acceptance is considered a serious social 
issue. However, in rural areas with a small and decreasing population, a high vacancy 
rate, especially in public nursery schools, is common (Nobe, 2010). If the holding 
capacity exceeds the number of potential applicants, municipalities may have 
incentives to reduce public nursery school expenditures. Note that since all 
independent and dependent variables are logarithmically transformed, the estimated 
coefficient indicates elasticity. 
In our empirical analysis, we divide our observations into several categories based 
on the size of municipalities to capture the difference in reactions. Although we refer to 
the JCA’s classification standard, our dataset does not fit it exactly. We do not have 
data for major cities and special wards; besides, many of the prefectural capital cities 
that experienced consolidation are excluded from our observations. Given these issues, 
we use the following three categories: core cities including some prefectural capital 
cities (population >= 150,000); small cities (50,000 =< population < 150,000); and 
towns and villages (population < 50,000).
８
 The sample sizes are 148, 340, and 1418, 
respectively.  
                                                   
７
 Although we can get details of staff numbers by occupation and employment status, the personnel 
expense figure is not available. 
８
 According to the Local Autonomy Act, a city is defined as a municipality if it has a population of 
more than 50,000. In fact, there are some parts of cities with populations of less than 50,000. Here we 
include such cities in category 3 as well. 
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Fig 5 show the distributional changes in operating costs per enrolled child in 2000 
and 2005. Cases 1 to 4 show the observations of full sample, core cities, small cities, 
and towns and villages, respectively. As seen from cases 1 and 4, municipalities that 
spent relatively high amounts on childcare per child were concentrated in areas with 
small populations. There were seven towns and five villages that spent more than 
2,500,000 yen in total. This may be because the number of enrolled children was too 
small in these areas. To check the robustness of estimation, we regress same models 
without observations whose dependent variable exceeds the range of three times as 
large as standard deviation.
９
 The mean values of childcare cost per enrolled child fell 
from 831,000 yen in 2000 to 775,000 yen in 2005 (Case 1: all); from 1,208,000 to 
1,089,000 yen (Case 2: core cities); from 981,000 to 857,000 yen (Case 3: small cities), 
and from 762,000 to 722,000 yen (Case 4: towns and villages), respectively. Although 
in Case 1 (full observations) we see hardly any significant change in costs between the 
two periods, it is obvious that the density distribution has shifted to the left side in 
Case 2 and Case 3. This shift in distribution implies that the operating costs per 
enrolled child tended to decrease overall, especially in core and small cities. As for the 
change in distributional variations, the values of standard deviation became smaller 
during the reform period in every case–from 476,000 to 448,000 yen (Case 1), from 
403,000 to 300,000 yen (Case 2), from 454,000 to 396,000 yen (Case 3), and from 
464,000 to 455,000 yen (Case 4), respectively. Disparities in spending seem to be 
smaller during this period. 
  
                                                   
９
 That is, the childcare cost per child was greater than 2,188,000 yen in the dataset of full observations. 
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Fig 5: Distributional changes in operating costs per enrolled child 
 
Note: The cost is not transformed into a logarithm. The cost covered by households in the form of 
the user charge is exempted. 
Source: Author 
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4. Results 
Table 1 presents the estimation results of regression model (1) with full observations. 
We ran pooled, random-effects, and fixed-effects models, and conducted the F-test, the 
Brush-Pagan LM test, and the Hausman test to specify a suitable model. A series of 
hypothesis testing supported the choice of a fixed-effects model as most appropriate. 
Since our main interest here is to examine the change in the effects of fiscal strength on 
operating costs during the reforms, we focus on the estimated parameters of FCI (𝛽1) 
and its interaction with D2005 (𝛽2). Columns (3) and (4) show the estimation results by 
fixed-effects model, while column (4) shows the year effect. In both results, 𝛽1 is 
statistically insignificant, implying that fiscal strength did not affect the per-child 
operating cost. The estimated 𝛽2 in column (3) is positively significant at the 1% level, 
implying that fiscally strong municipalities tended to increase per-child operating costs 
after the reforms. However, once we take the year trend into consideration, the 
coefficient is no longer significant. According to results of the likelihood ratio test, we 
support the result of column (4) and conclude that there seems to be no structural 
change in the impact of fiscal strength on operating costs for public nursery schools. 
Figures in column (5) show the result by IV model. Since we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that PRESCHOOL is exogenous, the parameters estimated by fixed-effects 
models are BLUE. Therefore, we will apply the fixed-effect model to the following 
analysis.  
    Table 2 reports the results using the separated municipality scale samples. In the 
case of core cities, municipal fiscal strength and per-child operating cost are positively 
correlated (see columns (1) and (2)). This means the stronger the municipalities, the 
more they spend on public nursery schools. However, the estimated coefficient of the 
year-interaction term (𝛽2) is negative and significant. That is, in relatively large cities, 
fiscally stronger municipalities reduced operating cost more significantly after the 
reforms than the others. Next, in the case of small cities, there seems to be no 
statistically significant correlation between fiscal strength and operating cost (see 
columns (3) and (4)). However, post-reforms, fiscally stronger municipalities were 
likely to increase per-child operating costs. We confirm this tendency even after 
controlling for year trends. Interestingly, the effects of fiscal strength on operating 
costs for public nursery schools after the reform go the opposite way in core cities and 
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small cities. After the reform, the “richer” municipalities in core cities spent less on 
public nursery schools; on the other hand, the “richer” municipalities in small cities 
spent more. This may be because public nursery schools play a much more prominent 
role in small cities than in bigger ones. In core cities, municipalities are more likely to 
spend less on costly public facilities so that they can boost substitute childcare services 
offered by the private sector or other parties. They may even have more incentives to 
advance the privatization of public facilities. In contrast, public nursery schools are a 
necessity in small cities, which makes municipalities respond to resident demands 
through public facilities. Lastly, columns (5) and (6) show the case of towns and 
villages. Although the estimated coefficients (𝛽2) indicate a positive effect, similar to 
that for small cities, it is no longer statistically significant once we consider the year 
effect. 
   We now look at some of the control variables from Table.2. Except for the case of 
small cities, the ratio of preschool population to total population (PRESCHOOL) is 
statistically negative and significant with a small p-value, which implies that 
diseconomies of scale due to the decline in young child-population pushes up the 
operating costs. After controlling for time trend, a 1% increase in preschool children 
old enough to receive childcare service decreases childcare cost by approximately 
0.6%. The coefficients of R1-2 are positive in all the cases implying that the high share 
of one- and two-year-old children pushes up the operating costs for public nursery 
schools. However, it is only significant in towns and villages. When we control for 
year effects, the coefficients of R0 and R3 are negative and statistically significant only 
in core cities. Since the cost of childcare is supposed to be inversely proportional to a 
child’s age, this result is rather unexpected. The average wage is significant and 
positively associated with the dependent variable, as expected. In core and small cities, 
the temporary staff ratio has a negative and significant effect on childcare cost. The 
impact is more significant in small cities, with a 1% increase in the ratio triggering an 
approximate 0.45% decrease in childcare cost per enrolled child. The coefficient of 
CAPSCHOOL is negative and significant at almost 5% in core cities, and towns and 
villages, indicating the existence of economies of scale. The estimated coefficient of 
SUFFICIENCY is negatively significant only in small cities. In small cities where 
public nursery schools’ sufficiency rate is higher, the municipality is likely to reduce 
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spending so that they can bridge the gap between supply and demand. 
Table 3 presents the results of the DID estimation. The first column in each 
sample category considers the case with only the 𝑁𝐿𝐴𝑇 dummy, whereas the second 
column reports the case with control variables. First, in the case of core cities, the 
estimated 𝛿  is negative and statistically significant (see columns (1) and (2)). 
Municipalities with no compensation through general resource revenue decrease 
per-enrolled-child operating cost by about 0.07% on average after controlling for other 
factors. This result admits the positive income effect of the compensation. Thus, in 
core cities, childcare service in public nursery schools can be regarded as a normal 
good. In the case of small cities, the result is the exact opposite of what happens in the 
core cities. The estimated coefficient of 𝛿 is positive and significant at 5%, as column 
(4) reports. In small cities, municipalities with no compensation through LAT increase 
per-enrolled-child operating cost by about 0.09% on average. That is, childcare service 
in public nursery schools can be considered an inferior good for municipalities in small 
cities. Columns (5) and (6) show the result for towns and villages; the estimated 
coefficient of 𝛿  is positive and implies the characteristics of an inferior good. 
However, it is insignificant and we fail to capture the average treatment effect of the 
reform. As for the other control variables, the significance and sign of coefficients are 
similar to the estimation results presented in Table 2.  
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Table1: Estimation results (full observations) 
 
Source: Author 
 
Pooled RE FE FE FEIV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FCI*D2005 0.08*** 0.068*** 0.0672*** 0.025 0.022
(0.024) (0.014) (0.026) (0.032) (0.033)
FCI 0.035 -0.011 -0.110 0.034 0.045
(0.034) (0.039) (0.128) (0.116) (0.114)
R0 0.120 0.118* 0.081 0.036 -0.030
(0.090) (0.064) (0.073) (0.075) (0.087)
R1-2 0.985*** 0.746*** 0.600*** 0.591*** 0.673***
(0.233) (0.166) (0.195) (0.187) (0.197)
R3 0.056 -0.069 -0.128 -0.108 -0.075
(0.118) (0.085) (0.102) (0.103) (0.106)
PRESCHOOL 0.415*** -0.410*** -0.383** -0.587*** -0.950***
(0.068) (0.072) (0.173) (0.202) (0.308)
POP 0.100*** 0.118*** -0.763** -0.426 -0.212
(0.015) (0.018) (0.338) (0.394) (0.457)
TAXPAYER 0.514*** -0.411*** 0.401 0.235 0.263
(0.109) (0.128) (0.260) (0.245) (0.246)
WAGE 0.626*** 0.512*** 0.317*** 0.316*** 0.316***
(0.027) (0.026) (0.106) (0.108) (0.107)
TEMPORARY STAFF -0.238*** -0.192*** -0.080 -0.074 -0.064
(0.058) (0.059) (0.085) (0.084) (0.085)
CAPSCHOOL -0.387*** -0.350*** -0.208** -0.174** -0.161*
(0.039) (0.043) (0.088) (0.088) (0.087)
SUFFICIENCY -0.056*** -0.036 0.034 0.005 -0.019
(0.021) (0.023) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052)
year effect -0.0878*** -0.119***
(0.029) (0.036)
Constant 1.092** 1.418*** 11.77*** 7.618*
(0.497) (0.479) (3.700) (4.404)
Observations 1,906 1,906 1,906 1,906 1,844
R-squared 0.330 0.126 0.149 0.159 0.152
Municipality fixed-effects no yes yes yes yes
Number of municipality 983 983 983 983 922
F test that all  Ui=0  F(982, 911) = 6.28*** 
Breusch and Pagan LM test  chibar2(1) = 432.55***
Hausman  test chi2(12)=86.59***
likelihood ratio-test
(specification model(3) or (4))
LR chi2(1)
=22.47***
F statistic(first stage) 61.00
Partial R-squared 0.313
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 49.25***
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.812
Tests of endogeneity of:
PRESCHOOL Durbin-Wu-
hausman test
1.173 Chi-sq(1)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All independent and dependent variables are logarithmically transformed.
Dependen Var.: per-child
operating cost for public
nursery school
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Table 2: Estimation results (observations by municipality scale) 
 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
 
  
FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FCI*D2005 -0.164** -0.251*** 0.169*** 0.107* 0.0628** 0.041
(0.082) (0.079) (0.055) (0.064) (0.028) (0.038)
FCI 0.377 0.733*** -0.104 0.119 -0.159 -0.081
(0.361) (0.272) (0.224) (0.231) (0.145) (0.136)
R0 -0.290 -0.871* 0.519* 0.296 0.035 0.021
(0.488) (0.453) (0.272) (0.309) (0.075) (0.077)
R1-2 1.328 0.665 0.845 0.742 0.524*** 0.531***
(1.168) (0.813) (0.706) (0.691) (0.192) (0.190)
R3 -1.811*** -1.676*** -0.476 -0.400 -0.133 -0.123
(0.614) (0.461) (0.388) (0.377) (0.103) (0.106)
PRESCHOOL 0.163 -0.661** -0.011 -0.319 -0.518*** -0.588***
(0.432) (0.323) (0.250) (0.292) (0.199) (0.218)
POP -0.975 0.579 -0.628 -0.212 -0.524 -0.438
(0.767) (0.587) (0.595) (0.654) (0.391) (0.421)
TAXPAYER 0.569 -0.217 0.857 0.557 0.339 0.270
(1.029) (0.960) (0.749) (0.744) (0.267) (0.257)
WAGE 0.747*** 0.773*** 0.403*** 0.393** 0.256** 0.258**
(0.034) (0.033) (0.143) (0.154) (0.117) (0.117)
TEMPORARY STAFF -0.159 -0.165* -0.467*** -0.458*** -0.005 -0.002
(0.103) (0.091) (0.155) (0.163) (0.084) (0.084)
CAPSCHOOL -0.501* -0.479** -0.157 -0.108 -0.211** -0.196**
(0.269) (0.228) (0.173) (0.171) (0.092) (0.093)
SUFFICIENCY 0.095 0.021 -0.162** -0.188** 0.031 0.022
(0.063) (0.050) (0.081) (0.078) (0.058) (0.059)
year effect -0.201*** -0.0924* -0.047
(0.042) (0.053) (0.040)
Constant 13.130 -10.980 12.30* 6.053 8.839** 7.769*
(9.168) (8.004) (7.284) (8.231) (4.033) (4.395)
Observations 148 148 340 340 1,418 1,418
R-squared (within) 0.916 0.938 0.44 0.452 0.118 0.12
Municipality fixed-effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of municipality 81 81 175 175 734 734
likelihood ratio-test
LR chi2(1)
=45.21***
LR chi2(1)
=7.13***
LR chi2(1)
 = 3.14*
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All independent and dependent variables are logarithmically transformed.
Dependen Var.: per-child
operating cost for public
nursery school
Core cities Small cities Towns and Villages
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Table 3: Estimation results (DID estimation) 
 
 
Source: Author 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
non-LAT municipality -0.1199* -0.0730** 0.073 0.0937** 0.058 0.111
(0.072) (0.031) (0.054) (0.047) (0.088) (0.089)
⊿FCI 0.692** 0.090 -0.118
(0.267) (0.227) (0.129)
⊿R0 -0.903** 0.289 0.019
(0.424) (0.305) (0.077)
⊿R1-2 0.881 0.689 0.527***
(0.796) (0.689) (0.187)
⊿R3 -1.677*** -0.400 -0.127
(0.479) (0.373) (0.107)
⊿PRESCHOOL -0.789** -0.268 -0.609***
(0.323) (0.288) (0.215)
⊿POP 0.263 -0.178 -0.301
(0.600) (0.634) (0.343)
⊿TAXPAYER -0.718 0.540 0.328
(0.904) (0.733) (0.249)
⊿WAGE 0.782*** 0.374** 0.258**
(0.029) (0.146) (0.118)
⊿TEMPORARY STAFF -0.129 -0.437*** -0.016
(0.079) (0.154) (0.083)
⊿CAPSCHOOL -0.522*** -0.132 -0.192**
(0.195) (0.176) (0.093)
⊿SUFICIENCY 0.017 -0.180** 0.018
(0.044) (0.073) (0.059)
Constant -0.051*** -0.125** -0.072*** -0.131*** -0.060*** -0.0881***
(0.022) (0.052) (0.020) (0.046) (0.021) (0.029)
Observations 69 69 171 168 744 685
R-squared 0.025 0.91 0.013 0.233 0.001 0.103
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All independent and dependent variables are logarithmically transformed.
Dependen Var.: per-
child operating cost for
public nursery school
Core cities Small cities Towns and Villages
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
per-child operating cost
for public nursery school
6.55 0.64 0.74 8.69 6.98 0.40 4.71 7.69 6.71 0.55 3.81 7.74 6.47 0.66 0.74 8.69
FCI -0.86 0.69 -2.81 0.91 -0.11 0.20 -0.76 0.50 -0.28 0.28 -1.02 0.54 -1.08 0.65 -2.81 0.91
R0 -1.87 0.16 -3.26 -1.17 -1.81 0.06 -1.96 -1.65 -1.83 0.08 -2.10 -1.67 -1.89 0.17 -3.26 -1.17
R1-2 -0.74 0.07 -1.31 -0.41 -0.71 0.03 -0.77 -0.63 -0.72 0.04 -0.82 -0.60 -0.75 0.07 -1.31 -0.41
R3 -1.77 0.11 -2.81 -1.10 -1.78 0.02 -1.83 -1.72 -1.78 0.04 -1.89 -1.65 -1.77 0.13 -2.81 -1.10
PRESCHOOL -2.98 0.22 -4.19 -2.40 -2.88 0.11 -3.18 -2.56 -2.87 0.15 -3.27 -2.41 -3.02 0.23 -4.19 -2.40
POP 9.87 1.39 5.31 15.09 12.56 0.61 11.92 15.09 11.29 0.31 10.82 11.92 9.25 0.95 5.31 10.82
TAXPAYER -1.00 0.15 -1.73 -0.61 -0.88 0.07 -1.22 -0.76 -0.91 0.10 -1.36 -0.75 -1.03 0.16 -1.73 -0.61
WAGE 8.81 0.46 4.17 11.32 8.93 0.30 5.84 9.41 8.86 0.43 4.93 11.21 8.79 0.47 4.17 11.32
TEMPORARY STAFF 0.07 0.21 0.00 1.84 0.07 0.18 0.00 0.91 0.05 0.19 0.00 1.84 0.08 0.22 0.00 1.79
CAPSCHOOL 4.32 0.41 2.71 5.63 4.57 0.17 4.14 4.92 4.55 0.25 3.40 5.25 4.24 0.42 2.71 5.63
SUFFICIENCY -0.35 0.67 -3.30 1.91 -0.83 0.59 -2.78 1.91 -0.68 0.63 -2.78 0.45 -0.22 0.64 -3.30 1.67
148 340 14181906
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
⊿per-child operating cost
for public nursery school
-0.08 0.41 -3.91 2.97 -0.09 0.36 -0.70 2.56 -0.14 0.23 -0.76 0.95 -0.06 0.45 -3.91 2.97
non-LAT municipality 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
⊿FCI 0.11 0.11 -0.28 0.98 0.03 0.07 -0.12 0.19 0.06 0.07 -0.25 0.23 0.13 0.11 -0.28 0.98
⊿R0 -0.07 0.21 -1.75 1.38 -0.09 0.04 -0.18 0.02 -0.08 0.07 -0.27 0.10 -0.07 0.24 -1.75 1.38
⊿R1-2 -0.02 0.09 -0.68 0.46 -0.04 0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.13 0.05 -0.02 0.10 -0.68 0.46
⊿R3 0.02 0.15 -1.02 0.72 0.02 0.03 -0.07 0.08 0.02 0.05 -0.14 0.13 0.03 0.17 -1.02 0.72
⊿PRESCH -0.07 0.10 -0.82 0.61 -0.05 0.05 -0.15 0.10 -0.06 0.06 -0.33 0.09 -0.07 0.12 -0.82 0.61
⊿POP -0.02 0.05 -0.40 0.26 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.16 0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.11 -0.03 0.05 -0.40 0.26
⊿TAXPAYER -0.02 0.05 -0.33 0.23 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.09 0.06 -0.03 0.06 -0.33 0.23
⊿WAGE 0.02 0.36 -2.48 3.49 0.02 0.44 -0.33 3.49 -0.02 0.27 -2.24 1.16 0.03 0.36 -2.48 3.37
⊿TEMPORARY STAFF 0.03 0.20 -1.84 1.63 0.01 0.15 -0.46 0.69 -0.01 0.20 -1.84 0.51 0.04 0.20 -1.40 1.63
⊿CAPSCHOOL 0.03 0.17 -0.69 1.16 0.02 0.06 -0.22 0.15 0.04 0.10 -0.30 0.59 0.03 0.19 -0.69 1.16
⊿SUFFICIENCY -0.07 0.32 -1.72 2.01 -0.11 0.28 -0.81 1.89 -0.10 0.23 -1.59 1.62 -0.06 0.34 -1.72 2.01
ALL Core cities Small cities Towns and Villages
922 69 168 685
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5. Conclusion 
In the early 2000s, a series of structural reforms were initiated to give local 
governments more fiscal autonomy through decentralization. The 2004 change in the 
funding system for public nursery schools was one such initiative. This reform 
abolished the national subsidy for public nursery schools and compensated this loss 
with the LAT. Several studies have claimed that this change led to local governments 
spending less on public nursery schools, given their increasing autonomy. However, 
few studies examined this impact empirically. Using a panel dataset for municipalities 
across Japan for the years 2000 and 2005, we investigated the structural change in the 
impact of fiscal strength on operating costs for public nursery schools before and after 
the reforms and the average treatment effect of the reforms given that the revenue 
compensation through LAT was applied only to specific municipalities. 
  We found that large and small cities were likely to respond differently to the reforms. 
As to the first question, in areas with relatively large populations, such as core cities, 
fiscally stronger municipalities were likely to spend less on public nursery schools 
after the reforms. The share of private nursery schools, which are more flexible in 
meeting a growing demand, was higher in urban than in rural areas. Fiscally stronger 
municipalities tended to shrink the size of the public sector to shift the budget 
allocation from the public to the private sector or advance the privatization of public 
facilities. On the other hand, as public nursery schools play the role of a necessary 
good in small cities, fiscally stronger municipalities enriched the public sector when 
they had greater fiscal discretion. We did not observe any change in the impact of fiscal 
strength on public nursery school expenditures in towns and villages before and after 
the reforms. We utilized a DID approach to answer the second question since 
compensation for the loss of national subsidy was only applicable to LAT 
municipalities. We found that in core cities, municipalities that did not receive revenue 
compensation from LAT and faced a rise in the real price of public childcare services, 
decreased expenditures on public nursery schools. Thus, in these areas, childcare in 
public nursery schools can be regarded as a normal good. We found the opposite result 
in small cities, regardless of the rise in the real price of public childcare service. 
Municipalities tended to increase expenditures, implying that childcare service in 
public nursery schools is an inferior good. 
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Our paper shows how local governments reacted when they had more autonomy 
when dealing with public nursery school management. Their different responses, 
depending on the size of cities or fiscal capacity, reflect the differences in the role and 
positioning of public nursery schools in each region. Policymakers should pay more 
attention to such complex information to determine the best childcare policy. Further 
research is necessary for an updated picture of the current situation with regard to 
public nursery schools, examining not only the immediate impact but also the 
long-term influence of the reforms. Applying other indicators such as the progress of 
privatization may also be useful to provide deeper insights.  
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Appendix 
The variables used in this paper are defined as follows 
 
 Per enrolled child operating cost (y): 
Cost per child attending public nursery schools in the municipality, excluding a user 
charge burdened by households.  
 FCI: 
Fiscal capacity indicator in the municipality 
 R0: 
The share of infants aged 0 in the preschool population in the municipality 
 R1-2: 
The share of children aged 1 and 2 in the preschool population in the municipality 
 R3: 
The share of children aged 3 in the preschool population in the municipality 
 PRESCHOOL: 
The share of children under the age of 5 in total population in the municipality 
 POP: 
Population in the municipality 
 TAXPAYER: 
The share of taxpayers in total population in the municipality 
 WAGE: 
The regular personnel expense divided by the total number of administrative and 
nursery staff after deducting temporary staff 
 TEMPORARY STAFF: 
The share of temporary hired staff in total staff 
 CAPSCHOOL: 
The holding capacity of public nursery schools in the municipality 
 SUFFICIENCY: 
The ratio of total holding capacity of public nursery schools to the number of potential 
applicants in the municipality 
 
 
